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Why India Rejects The International Criminal Court


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Why India Rejects the International Criminal Court

A Study of India’s Post-Colonial Foreign Policy Identity

This paper treats the rejection of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the Republic of India. For long the academic community has neglected to put effort into scrutinizing the position of the Indian Union on the subject of an international criminal court, even though her stance on the subject is of special importance to the international community as one sixth of the world’s population was refused access to one of the principal human rights protection schemes of our post-modern time. However, despite the fact that the Indian population numbers over one billion people, the reason for this paper is the surprise and shock that was conveyed by the international community at India’s decision to abstain from the final vote on the Rome Statute.

Introduction:

This paper treats the rejection of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the Republic of India. For long the academic community has neglected to put effort into scrutinizing the position of the Indian Union on the subject of an international criminal court, even though her stance on the subject is of special importance to the international community as one sixth of the world’s population was refused access to one of the principal human rights protection schemes of our post-modern time. However, despite the fact that the Indian population numbers over one billion people, the reason for this paper is the surprise and shock that was conveyed by the international community at India’s decision to abstain from the final vote on the Rome Statute. The rejection of the Rome Statute by the US, deriving from her strategically unique situation as the sole remaining superpower, and the resulting rejection of egalitarian multilateralism was considered and discussed intensively by the academic community. The rejection of the ICC by the authoritarian regime in China is of limited surprise.

However, India continues to puzzle the international community through her rejectionist stance. The aversion to ratify the Rome Statute displayed by the Republic of India, as the so-called ‘largest democracy in the world’, with a far-ranging human rights catalogue guaranteed by her constitution, and being one of the major provider of troops for United Nations (UN) peace-keeping operations, comes as a great surprise, considering especially the determined way in which that rejection was communicated to the international community. Furthermore, the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV, Art. 41 of the Indian constitution provide as a matter of state policy that India should:

“[…] endeavour to promote international peace and security; maintain just and honourable relations between nations; foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples.” (Cohen, 2001, p. 52)

Thus the question arises why a country with such a strong belief in human rights and democracy, which were anchored in its constitution, would prevent its population from gaining access to the ICC. In fact, the author assumes that the reasons for India’s rejection of the ICC have not been systematically researched so far. In addition, the field of international criminal law has, made a quantum leap with the erection of the ICC so that literature has not dealt exhaustively with all relevant questions. A theoretical framework has thus to be developed first to answer the current question and will logically remain open to further development and criticism.

In order to find an answer to that question in part one this paper will first have a look at the characteristics and idiosyncrasies of India’s foreign policy in general. The traditional importance that is given to securing national sovereignty as a principle feature in India’s foreign policy follows from a short review of its historical causes. Theoretically, this research relates to identity-based analyses and especially those concerning the psychological dimension of Indian foreign policy in terms of how and why foreign policy mindsets have formed and the continuing relationship that this has concerning both India’s domestic and international interaction.

It will be argued that it is India’s post-colonial identity, which is the grid on which her foreign policy is built. Deriving from that is the fundamental rejection of any interference in domestic affairs as well as even the slightest infringement on state sovereignty. Special focus will be given to how Indian post-colonial identity is constructed, who constructed it and on what principles it was built. As will be shown multiculturalism, and anti-imperialism are the three pillars on which Indian foreign policy and nationhood was erected and the divisive effects of a multi-cultural and multi-religious society are countered by the belief in a strong and indestructible nation free from foreign interference.

Subsequently, part two will deal with a multifaceted approach towards potential infringement on the principle of national sovereignty through the Rome Statute. Thereby, the Rome Statute will be analyzed on potential intrusions on state sovereignty as perceived by India whose perception is not always thoroughly founded in legal logic but very much influenced by the aspects of power politics undergirding international relations. It should become clear that the ICC can be seen as a new instrument of global governance in respect of multi-level politics. As will be explained in greater detail, the ICC could absorb the function of an agent controlling the sometimes anarchic situation of India’s domestic criminal prosecution system. As such this paper might even serve as exemplary research of how willing the growing super-power India is to work with modern global governance models in general taking its post-colonial reflexes and the suspicion with which it regards the other great powers. However, the constraints of this paper should be kept in mind as it only deals with the ICC and India as a case study, without any extensive comparison.

The Indian perception of what is legally and politically possible under the Rome Statute and what sentiments and beliefs the Indian elite sees undermined by the ICC is very important in explaining India’s rejectionist stance. In order to understand India’s position a range of issues arising from the powers of the ICC under the Rome Statute and from Indian domestic affairs will be examined. Among these are the inclusion of intra-state conflicts in the jurisdiction of the ICC, the fact that the ICC has complementary jurisdiction and the role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in referring and blocking cases. Parallel to raising these issues it will be shown how these relate to India’s post-colonial foreign policy principles.

Part I: Characteristics of Indian Foreign Policy When one wants to understand India’s decision to reject the Rome Statute one has to look at her foreign policy imperatives and how these imperatives came about. The overarching focus of India’s foreign policy immediately after its independence from British rule in 1947 was marked by determined opposition to the internationality of British imperialism, which in the eyes of Indian rulers was an exploitative system imposed upon colonial peoples and designed for expansion and self-perpetuation (Kuracina, 2007, p. 519). In the colonies there was regular use of force and unfree labor, which mostly occurred at the beginning of metropolitan forms of capitalism (Rex & Singh, 2003, p. 108).

At that time the Congress as the leading political organization in India’s anti-colonial fight and would be the ruling party for many decades to come. The exploitation suffered by the hands of British and French imperialism necessitated that the Congress clearly establish a rejectionist attitude toward this international system and the principles underlying such a system (Kuracina, 2007, p. 519). Of the Congress’s internationalists, Jawaharlal Nehru who would be India’s first prime minister and external affairs minister from 1947 until his death in 1964 most directly impacted the development of the Congress’s attitude toward global politics. Thus foreign policy was constructed upon the twin pillars of Nehruvian international relations: anti-imperialism and anti-fascism (Kuracina, 2007, p. 519).

Already the mid-1930s, when India’s struggle for independence gained full speed, saw the enunciation of principles that would continue to constrain the country’s foreign policy option (Kuracina, 2007, p. 530). Anti-imperialism became the foundation of India’s international relations, a perspective that was infused with an existing conceptualization of non-alignment in global factions as witnessed during the Cold War (Kuracina, 2007, p. 530). India’s strategic culture is thus to a large extent influenced and coined by the ontological feature of its history. As Bhaskar puts it: “As a civilizational-state (a characteristic it shares with China) there is an inherited, albeit burnished dominant narrative about the past even as it seeks to grapple with modernity in all its manifestations.” (Bhaskar, 2006, p. 97/98)

Besides India’s strong stance against imperialism, on the withdrawal of the metropolitan ruler, it also inherited a vastly multicultural and plural society. In the event of political independence in many formerly colonial societies, political power passed to one of the ethnic segments who would then govern the state. India (alongside other countries such as Malaysia) was thus confronted with a multicultural and multi-religious society, economic underdevelopment and the threat of balkanization (Rex & Singh, 2003, p. 111). Essentially what India was left with was the quest for an identity that could guarantee the coherence of the political and territorial unit called India.

Congress thus opted for two specific mechanisms which would prevent the partition of India in hundred little kingdoms: one was the guise of nationalism and the other the devolution of power to federal states. In this paper the author is only concerned with the former, as this was a mechanism that would allow the dominant ethnic segment of India (i.e. the Hindus) to speak with one voice for the nation. The Indian constitution serves as a mirror of Indian nationalist strategic culture. It is claimed that the Indian constitution is a multicultural document in the sense that it allows for the accommodation of the country’s diversity. Yet it contains elements that would guarantee the survival of this multi-ethnic country (Bhattacharyya, 2003, p. 151). These were secularism and state non-interference in religion, and democratic centralism, whereby the constitution ruled out the principle of self-determination for regions and nationalities. Art. 3 to 4 of the Indian Constitution thus provide for an “indestructible nation of destructible states, allowing for the alteration of Union territories [within the Union] while ensuring the territorial integrity of the Union” (Tatla, 2003, p. 180).

Therefore, in 1947, the newly independent India integrated a host of social and religious identities into a centralized state apparatus, while emphasizing the importance of national unity through diversity and what was called India’s ‘sacred geography’ (Krishna, 1996, p. 221). What followed from that quest for national identity was a foreign policy coupled with an ongoing identity construction. Such a theoretical concept allows for India’s foreign policy to be regarded as stemming from its national context, rather than purely through external pressures and challenges on a systemic or regional level (Ogden, 2007, p. 2). As such Nehruvian foreign policy was assertive of the nation’s importance in global affairs conceiving of India as having ‘special rights and duties in the management of international society based on its status as one of the world’s major civilizations’ (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 119). Alongside Indian political leaders envisaged Purna Swaraj – complete independence – both economically as well as politically from the great power games played in the international arena (Ogden, 2007, p. 3). The rejection of any infringement on national sovereignty and unity was thus exemplified by India’s attitude towards its domestic set-up where schismatic behavior of its provinces was discouraged and through its policies of economic self-reliance (swadeshi), which was rationalized as leading to stability and self-sufficiency and autonomy. India even today remains suspicious of foreign investment, transnational companies, and a globalised economic order “regarding them as threatening Indian independence with coercive and restrictive multilateral organizations such as the IMF and WTO” (Ogden, 2007, p. 13). As Zinkin put it in 1955:

“Indeed, almost all Indian attitudes toward the outside world are tinged by India’s abhorrence of colonialism. […]. This determination of Indians to keep the right to judge for themselves, by themselves, which they have so recently recovered, is the key to much of their policy” (Zinkin, 1955, p. 113)

Amrita Narlikar even compares Indian foreign policy to a porcupine and calls it “vegetarian, slow-footed and prickly” (Narlikar, 2006, p. 59). Narlikar claims that “the famous defensiveness of the porcupine became the hallmark of India’s approach to the world” (Narlikar, 2006, p. 59).

How pervasive the influence of a post-colonial identity can be and what ramifications it can have is exemplified by India’s strategic negotiation attitude. For a developing country, no matter whether it is large of small, the costs of constantly using a defensive and blocking negotiation strategy the political costs are extremely high (Narlikar, 2006, p. 60) Such a strict distributive strategy, where India wants to be on the exert more concessions than it is willing to make itself can lead to both real economic costs, such as an impasse in the current WTO negotiations, unrealized gains from failed negotiation, penalties from partners across issues and in follow-up negotiations, and normative costs such as being branded as a nay-sayer, and disruptive influence (Narlikar, 2006, p. 60). Even in the face of these costs India rejected the International Criminal Court and took the risk of incurring the wrath of the international community.

Amrita Niklarar attributes this attitude to a very strong colonial mindset and calls it “not surprising that Indian governments from widely divergent political parties have adopted very similar positions of resistance abroad, whether they involve negotiations in the WTO or over nuclear proliferation” (2006, p. 72), ring-fencing the Kashmir dispute from the sporadic interference by US governments, or as in this case over the Rome Statute. However, it also derives partly from India’s self-perception and her claim of peculiarity on the world stage flowing forth from the nationalist attitude it had to adopt in order to maintain the territoriality of the Union intact. Thus Stephen Cohen proclaims that ‘Indian officials believe they are representing not just a state but a civilization. Believing that India should be accorded deference and respect because of its intrinsic civilizational qualities, many Indian diplomats and strategists are aware of having to depend upon states that do not appreciate India’s special and unique characteristics’ (Narlikar, 2006, p. 72).

Part II: The ICC and Potential Infringements on India’s Sovereignty

1. The Jurisdiction of the Court and the Role of the Prosecutor

Having explored the underlying principles of Indian foreign policy and the extensive influence that the anti-colonial mind-set had on the formulation of Indian foreign policy and her dealing with international institutions, this paper will now turn to the ICC and in particular to its perceived and actual effects on Indian sovereignty and independence. This section will be divided in four parts. First the principle of complementarity of jurisdiction and the inherent jurisdiction of the ICC will be explored in relation to India’s sovereignty. Secondly, the inclusion of “armed conflicts not of an international character” under the jurisdiction of the court has ramifications on India’s domestic conflicts, such as the pogroms in Gujarat following the burning of a train carrying Hindu pilgrims from a site of political contest in Ayodhya. The third point will deal with the role of the Security Council in referring to and withholding cases from the ICC, which in a larger picture also refers to the missing of an opt-in clause for jurisdiction and the issue of state consent to jurisdiction.

In his statements at the Conference on the International Criminal Court on June 16, 1998, India’s Additional Secretary to the UN, Mr. Dilip Lahiri:

“stressed that the ICC should be based on the principles of complementarity, State sovereignty, and non-intervention in internal affairs of States, and that its Statute should be such as to attract the widest acceptability of States, with State consent as the cornerstone of the ICC jurisdiction.”(Lahiri, June 16, 1998).

Complementarity has been defined by legal scholars as comprising three elements. First, any state has the right to hold a trial for crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and the national courts retain jurisdiction over these crimes. There are however two situations when the ICC may step it. First, if the country in question is unwilling to prosecute the crime, or clearly shielding someone from responsibility for ICC crimes, and secondly, if the country in question is genuinely unable to investigate or prosecute ICC crimes because its legal system has collapsed (Art. 17 (1) (b), Rome Statute).

The complementarity provisions of the ICC Statute (Articles 17 to 19) are thus central to the understanding of India’s rejectionist stance, even though the Rome Statue constrains the Court’s investigations to those situations where a state concerned is unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute, and thus if India would carry out genuine investigations the ICC would not have jurisdiction (Radosavljevic, 2007). Still, India rejected the Rome Statute, calling it a “travesty of law” if it demands of states to constantly prove the viability of its juridical system. Clearly, India had envisaged a role for the ICC in situations where the national juridical system has collapsed completely, as in post-war societies such as Yugoslavia (Lahiri, June 16, 1998). From the wording of the complementarity regime however, India fears that its own system would be judged unable or unwilling to prosecute. In 2005, the Indian government representative Shri Rao Interjit Singh answered questions in the Lok Sabha why India rejected the Rome Statute. He said:

„India has not signed the Statute of the International Criminal Court as there are several deficiencies in the Statute, including that it brings under the purview of the Court several crimes, which are subject to national jurisdiction, and makes the primacy of national jurisdiction subject to the satisfaction of the Court.“ (MEA, 2005)

That the ICC indeed embodied a threat to national sovereignty in the Indian perception becomes evident in the Indian foreign minister’s speech in Cairo in 2001. Jaswant Singh then declared that:

“The doctrine of humanitarian intervention in civil wars, has effectively superseded the older doctrine of untrammeled national sovereignty. To this web of human rights and social standards, environment, etc. other new factors are on the anvil. Most prominently, the imminent creation of an international criminal court.” (Singh, 2001)

The Indian juridical system is overburdened, corrupt and slow as will be shown later in the case study of the Gujarat Pogrom. As Ramanathan puts it ”India’s resistance to accepting the inherent jurisdiction of the ICC is explained, in part, by anxieties about how investigation, prosecution and criminal proceedings in the Indian system may be judged by an international court.”(2005, p. 627). Inherent jurisdiction was thus perceived as a violation of the consent of states, and thus a threat to sovereignty.

The issue is further aggravated by the perceived role of the ICC Prosecutor. In addition to State Party and Security Council referrals, the Prosecutor may receive information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court provided by other sources, such as individuals or non-governmental organizations. If the Prosecutor decides after a preliminary examination of this information that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he will request a Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize an investigation (Office of the Prosecutor). The Indian delegation thus was afraid that an independent prosecutor could initiate investigations proprio motu (Article 15 Rome Statute) and thereby trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC. India instead favoured optional jurisdiction of the ICC and rejected any inherent or compulsory jurisdiction “which dispenses with [...] an essential sovereign attribute” (Lahiri, June 16, 1998). This issue is exacerbated as the deficiencies in India’s national juridical system (according to the current Statute) need not to be judged to be insuperable obstacles (i.e. a post-war situation of complete juridical collapse) in order for an international court to step in, judging the domestic court to be ‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’ (Ramanathan, 2005, p. 631).

2. The Inclusion of Non-international Armed Conflict in the Jurisdiction of the Court.

The second point of discontent for the Indian delegation was the inclusion of non-international armed conflict in the jurisdiction of the Court. India feared that the ICC will be used for embarrassing India through attempting to make a case out of the violence in Kashmir an issue seen as of vital importance for national security and thus national sovereignty, stemming from the strategic geographic position and resource richness of Kashmir and Jammu. India has led two wars with Pakistan over the issue of Kashmir (1965, and 1999) and had to face the infiltration of the region with Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists, which led India to implement counter-insurgencies leading to situations of state-sponsored violence. The exclusion of international terrorism from the crimes covered by the ICC is perceived by India as opening possibilities for misuse of the inclusion armed conflict not of an international character in the jurisdiction of the ICC (Ramanathan, 2005, p. 631). Amnesty International (AI) has indeed criticized consistent and frequent human rights violations through Indian security forces and the lack of prosecution in these cases:

“In September, the State Human Rights Commission, which had registered 3,187 cases of human rights violations since its inception in 1991, reiterated its earlier complaint that government departments failed to implement its recommendations.” (AI, 2006)

It has thus to be considered whether there could be trials because of war crimes or crimes against humanity, which are theoretically both part of the Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 6-8.

However, it is not only the Kashmir conflict that India has to worry about should it accept the jurisdiction of the Court. Without clarity and precision of the crime against humanity (which still lacks a proper definition) (Lahiri, July 17, 1998) India could be subject to trials before the ICC on a range of domestic issues. For instance, the anti-Sikh riots that raged for three days following the assassination of the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, on 31 October 1984, by her own Sikh bodyguards, have left a legacy of a targeted community, where many were killed and the perpetrators never properly prosecuted. Even 20 years after that event, the judicial cleaning up process is not finished, despite the knowledge of state policy complicity. There were only few prosecutions and even fewer convictions (Ramanathan, 2005, p. 629). A more recent case was the targeting of the Muslim community by Hindus following the burning of a train carrying Hind pilgrims from Ayodyha in Uttar Pradesh. The state of Uttar Pradesh is suspected of complicity in the targeted violence against Muslims, which probably is one of the reasons why prosecution and punishment of perpetrators has been so difficult (Ramanathan, 2005, p. 630). The riots in Gujarat were classified by one retired judge of the Bombay High Court, Mr. Suresh as inhuman, targeted and dehumanized killings, which were implicitly backed by the Chief Minister of the Indian state by saying that: “every action has a reaction”. These are all elements needed to make the case that the reactions, which where witnessed in Gujarat and Godhra amount in fact to genocide, a crime over which the ICC has jurisdiction if the government is unwilling to prosecute the perpetrators (Suresh, 2002). Amnesty International comments on the inter-religious fights in Gujarat stating that: “Survivors of targeted killings and sexual violence in 2002, some of which had amounted to crimes against humanity, continued to be denied justice and reparations“ (2006). On the force used against Punjabi secessionist militants AI notes on the impunity of security forces:

“In Punjab, the vast majority of police officers responsible for serious human rights violations during the period of civil unrest in the mid-1990s continued to evade justice, despite the recommendations of several judicial inquiries and commissions.” (AI, 2006)

Mihir Desay, speaks of an “existing climate of impunity within the country”, which is of special importance as the ICC was founded with the explicit aim of putting an end to impunity (July 2004). Desay claims that existing laws could neither respond to large-scale human rights violations, such as genocide, nor provide adequate remedy for those seeking justice due to its “backlogs of cases, huge time delays, poor investigation and corruption” as well as a lack in definitions of grave crimes such as genocide under Indian law (July 2004). Furthermore, during a workshop in Mumbai he deplored the apparent immunity of prosecution for high-ranking government officials as the permission of the government is required for such prosecutions (Desay, 2004). This relates directly to the provision of “unwillingness” to prosecute, one of the principles of complementarity which allows interference in state sovereignty, so much dreaded by post-colonial Indian thinking. In fact, the inherent jurisdiction of the ICC would challenge these politics of impunity and allow for accountability and justice in the face of grave crimes.

3. The Role of the United Nations Security Council

The last point of contest is the role of the United National Security Council in referring and blocking cases. Regarding the fundamental principle of equality of states and non-interference in domestic affairs and anti-imperialism, it is not hard to conceive why India has problems with any role foreseen for the Security Council especially given India’s claim to a permanent seat in the SC, which so far is denied and the current composition of the Council. It comprises five veto powers; two of them are former colonial masters of India (France and Britain).

Furthermore, India had a war with China in 1962 in which it was utterly defeated and the US has strong ties with India’s arch-rival Pakistan. Moreover, the Russia of today is not the Soviet Union of the old times, with which India had friendly relations and which would back India on questions such as Kashmir in the UNSC.

In short, the mandate given to the SC in triggering the prosecution of cases and its power to defer prosecution caused discontent within the Indian delegation throughout the PrepComs. That the SC would have the power to act as a trigger to prosecution was following from its role in establishing previous international courts tasked with the prosecution of war crimes, such as the ICTY. The Indian delegation argued the establishment of the ICTY does not obtain the status of a precedent, and that “the need for the Security Council to continue to establish ad hoc tribunals vanishes” now that the ICC is in place (Lahiri, June 16, 1998). Specifically at the Rome conference the Indian Delegate argued that the UN Charter does not give the Council the power to establish Courts, and that the only reason it can do so and continues to do so is that its power cannot be challenged. Thus flowing from India’s strong anti-imperial stance, having a Council in place that has the power to refer, the power to block and the power to bind non-States parties is undesirable and contrary to India’s anti-imperialist pillar of foreign policy (Lahiri, July 17, 1998). Giving the SC the power to bind states not party to the Rome Statute, would also violate principles of international law as stipulated under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Conclusion:

Coming to a conclusion a largely parallel logic becomes apparent. The Republic of India was founded on the principles of anti-imperialism and nationalism, which subsequently was transferred to her foreign policy strategy. The rejection of international agreements that do not respond to India’s strict distributive negotiation strategy as witnessed in recent WTO and nuclear proliferation agreements flows forth from an anti-colonial mindset that rejects any interference in state sovereignty and nationalist rhetoric that claims a special place for India in the formulation of international principles and proclaims a strong sense of pride both in Indian economic success since the liberalization of 1991 and the administrative and judicial system that was inherited by the British.

Having the juridical independence undermined by an International Court and attacked in case of the Courts finding of the Indian juridical system being inadequate and unable to prosecute, would deal a harsh blow to Indian national self-esteem and its self-perceived commitment to the protection of human rights.

As demonstrated throughout this paper there are a number of challenges to Indian self-perception, one of them being a harsh criticism of the Indian domestic juridical system and the ability and willingness to prosecute crimes that come quite close to constituting genocide. In consequence, having an independent prosecutor at the ICC who is allowed to start investigations following a pre-trial chamber proceeding and acceding to a Court that might judge the Indian judicial system to be incapable of prosecuting crimes under the Rome Statute, is not an option for India that suffered two hundred years of colonial rule and only recently was acknowledged by the international community to represent a growing power in the international arena. A loss of sovereignty at such an early stage of entry in international power politics would not only constrain Indian foreign policy with regard to Kashmir, but also endanger its territorial unity, as it would force India to discontinue its current state policy of military oppression of secessionist states, such as happened with Punjap (1983-1993) and the North Eastern Territories due to fear of being prosecuted by the ICC.

However, the ICC as an institution of international relevance is still very new, and the codification of criminal law which was done by the Rome Statute has so far not revealed all its ramifications, It is therefore logical that a state such as India that just celebrated its 60th independence day in 2007, is cautious to accede to an instrument that it perceives to have been set up by the same Western community with which it had bad dealings for over two hundred years. The fact that the academic community is still divided over the question of whether state sovereignty is infringed upon by the ICC does certainly not help. As such Nikola Grillhoff answers the question by stating that states have in principle not delegated competences to prosecute crimes and thus no part of their sovereignty to the ICC. Still she talks about an infringement on the sovereignty of states, who cannot decide independently anymore whether to initiate criminal prosecution (1999, p. 40/41). Farbstein on the other hand explicitly talks about a partial delegation of sovereignty: “[…] States recognize their shared interests and sacrifice a degree of sovereignty in order to render genuine justice.“ (2001, p. 72). Hence even though in the academic world the question of whether state sovereignty is infringed upon by the ICC is not yet fully answered, the Indian perception of the ICC as having the power to potentially intrude and limit Indian sovereignty is enough to reject the Rome Statute.

Hence the perspectives for Indian support of modern global governance elements, which entail a partial delegation of sovereignty to international organizations, are decisively weaker than the idealistic and promising start of Indian foreign policy and her multilateral rhetoric made believe. It is likely that even in the event of a final solution for Kashmir and Jammu there will still be to many variables that make an acceptance of the Rome Statute by India unlikely. For a change in these perspectives, a change in domestic policy is necessary and an alteration of the perception of the world by Indian leaders. More democratic checks and balances as well as a greater efficacy of Indian courts would be needed to strengthen India’s multilateral foreign policy, which has to go hand in hand with a greater civilization of its domestic politics and recourse to other forms of dispute settlement than state sponsored violence.

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