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Found 185 results

  1. ਖਾਲਸਾ ਸਾਜਨਾ ਅਤੇ ਗੁਰੂ ਸਾਹਿਬਾਨ ਵੱਲੋਂ ਸਮਾਜ ਲਿਆਂਦੀ ਅਧਿਆਤਮਿਕ ਅਤੇ ਸੂਰਮਈ ਕ੍ਰਾਂਤੀ| Khalsa sajna and revolutions in society by Guru Sahibaan. ਖਾਲਸੇ ਦੀ ਸਾਜਨਾ ਗੁਰੂ ਗੋਬਿੰਦ ਸਿੰਘ ਜੀ ਦੁਆਰਾ ੩੦ ਮਾਰਚ ੧੬੯੯ ਨੂੰ ਕੀਤੀ ਗਈ, ਪਰ ਖਾਲਸੇ ਨੂੰ ਪੂਰੀ ਤਰਾਂ ਤਿਆਰ ਹੋਣ ਲਈ ੨੩੦ ਸਾਲ ਦਾ ਸਮਾਂ ਲੱਗਾ, ਜਿਸ ਵਿੱਚ ਗੁਰੂ ਸਾਹਿਬਾਨ ਵੱਲੋਂ ਸਮਾਜ ਵਿੱਚ ਅਨੇਕਾਂ ਕ੍ਰਾਂਤੀਆਂ ਲਿਆਂਦੀ ਗਈਆਂ| Foundation of Khalsa was laid by Guru Gobind Singh Ji on 30 March 1699. But preparation of Khalsa was a long process of 230 years. In these years, Guru Sahibaan brought about several revolutions in the society. Check out this infographic by Sikh Stage for complete read - ਪੂਰਾ ਪੜ੍ਹਨ ਲਈ ਕਲਿੱਕ ਕਰੋ http://on.fb.me/1NCEgFQ
  2. What decision has been made BIKRAMI or Nanakshahi. Also what are your opinions. ?? BIKRAMI is the correct calender I believe, while the Nanakshahi crows seem to be dhunda and missionarya
  3. http://kam1825.podbean.com/e/akhbars-previous-life/
  4. Can anyone please tell me where in Dasam Bani it says the following: Raj bina neh Dharam chale hain Dharam bina sab dale male hain
  5. Throughout the years there has been problems here and there in our Panth ranging from different areas that affect the Panth as a whole. The Punj Pyare court system isn't a new brought up idea but why don't Sikh gurdwaras/councils/organizations take it into consideration? I have heard so many times Sikhs talking about it but don't push it first in their agenda. We really need to push for a punj pyare to govern gurdwaras in a country. This has to be one of the top ideas all Sikhs should be pushing forward in the coming years. The benefit of having a punj pyare system will solve many issues that are revolving in our Panth. It has to happen and it will help stabilize the Panth. Questions to ask ourselves: 1) Can different groups AKJ, Taksali, Nihungs.. come to together and make an agreement to set up the punj pyare regardless of differences? 2) Who will be against this decision that the Panth will have trouble with(gw committees, jathas?)
  6. http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=5r8rDeSf1jU
  7. 24 year old Sikh man has been stabbed at a Tescos store in Wales by a White Supremacist! The Singh was shopping at Tescos when this attack took place. ...the White Christian terrorist chased the Sikh man with a huge knife and hammer ..Whilst repeatedly shouting "White Power" Singh sustained injuries to the stomach, arms and hands. We condemn this attack, and wish Singh a full and speedy recovery. We ALSO question why the media did not highlight this racist attack...why wasn't the perpetrator of this attack branded by his religion. ....or class this as a Terrorist attack! AFTER ALL the Sikhs have done and continue to do so for this Country! FROM FB NEW DETAILS SOON MAYBE IN RETALIATION FROM THE RECENT CHARLIE HEBDO ATTACK? IGNORANCE IS TOO WIDESPREAD.
  8. Just for fun. Topic title says it all. I tend to agree with ProActive 99% of the time. (This despite the fact that the brother doesn't bother responding to inbox messages :lol2: ) Johnny bai's posts I tend to agree with most of the time too.
  9. I recently came across this article, its worth a read and surprisingly brilliant. http://prints.iiap.res.in/bitstream/2248/5294/1/On%20the%20historical%20significance%20of%20the%20total%20solar%20eclipse
  10. Why do we prerequisite being 'amritdhari' to speak up for Panthic issues? Many times I have seen people demanding others to take Khande di Pahul before talking about Panthic issues. But are the really two related? Jinnah, who founded Pakistan - the home for the Indian Muslims - was a non practising Muslim who enjoyed wine, women and pork. Theodor Herzl - founding father of Zionism - was a cultural Jew and a self admitted atheist.
  11. Isn't doing nitnem a ritual? Doesn't sggs ji forbid ritualism?
  12. Waheguru Ji Ka Khalsa Waheguru Ji Ki Fateh West Coast Sikhi Camp (California) is just around the corner. There are only a handful of spots remaining. This is a really good retreat for amritdharis to rejuvenate, as well as for those people who are new to Sikhi. Camp is open to Sikh youth and teenagers. Please check out our website on www.wcsikhicamp.com
  13. CHANDIGARH, India (November 4, 2014)—The hunger strike of Bhai Gurbaksh Singh Khalsa for the release of imprisoned Sikhs has been halted in uncertainty. Due to the non-availability of space and alert of Intelligence Agencies, Bhai Gurbaksh Singh is not succeeding in starting his hunger strike. It is worth mentioning that Bhai Khalsa announced few days ago that if the Jathedar of Sri Akal Takht Sahib will not fulfil his promise before Bandi Chhor Diwas, then he will again sit a hunger strike. He planned to start his hunger strike in Subhan of Jalandhar, but the police didn’t allow him. While expressing disappointment, he said that nobody is coming forward to provide space for his hunger strike. http://www.sikh24.com/2014/11/04/hunger-strike-of-bhai-gurbaksh-singh-stopped-due-to-non-availability-of-space/#.VFnM4fnF9K0
  14. Guest

    Ravidasi Singhs ?

    are the ravidassi granthi sings amrit dhari ? i honestly think they messed up sikhi from their amrit bani that they took out of guru granth sahib and respecting it like a guru granth sahib. like the link at the bottom i saw the babe wearing rakhdiyan and stuff and sometimes i don't see kara. what are your views on them? and why do they say "wjkk wjkf while guru go bind singh ji made that for sikh and its Bhagat ravidaas ji they call bhagat ji "guru ravidaas ji "
  15. I recently saw the trailer for this film and was saddened, especially seeing that Sikhs possess no viable film industry. http://www.flicks.co.nz/movie/the-dead-lands/ Ironically if we do ever have a historic Sikh film will it have exacerbated stunts like this:? I am sure that somewhere along the line the Punjab film industry grew confused between culture (Punjabi) and history (not balle balle).
  16. Some kid whose father is a decorated General in the armed forces goes to the same school where the son of a stick-wielding police constable (havaldaar) also studies. Now which one of these 2 would be more proud of his father? Obviously the son of a General! How does this make the havaldaars son feel? Obviously intimidated and perhaps even inferior! How do such people then react? They try every attempt to mock or humiliate someone who is way ahead of them in any aspect life. Some kid loves his father to death because he knows his father sacrificed so much just to give him a decent upbringing and a good education. Another kid doesnt even know who his father was, because his father left his mother before this kid was even born. Now which of these 2 will never tolerate any insult to his father? Obviously the first kid, because he owes everything to his father! This is the difference between the Sikhs and others, and this is the reason why were facing all these various sorts of troubles all over this world. Whether its the problems we face at the hands of Hindus in India, or Muslims in Islamic countries, or gorey/kaale/others in Western countries, this difference is the central issue at the core. We are proud of our Guru Sahibaan, our Puratan Singhs, our mahaan Sants, Sipahis and our Shaheeds. We are proud of their glorious legacy. Those who dont have such a history, or have a shameful history full of oppression and barbarity will always have a problem with us just like the son of a havaldaar has with the son of a General. The Generals son has pictures of his dad in uniform decked with medals. The son of a havaldaar knows his father doesnt even have a rifle. The Generals son can tell stories of how his dad won so many battles and faced the enemy fearlessly. What will the havaldaars son say? How his father beat up an innocent protester? Or how his havaldaar dad got slapped by a girl because he passed a lewd remark? What else can such people do besides cracking Sardar jokes? We are proud of our turbans, our beards, our 5 kakaars, because these are blessings of our Guru Sahibaan. Those who dont even know whom to worship/follow, what do they have in life that they can value? They are like that kid who never knew who/what his father was/is? Thus they have a problem with our turban, and they want it taken off at all airport checkpoints. They have a problem with our kara/kirpan and want these removed before we board buses. Why they have this problem? Because these poor fellows are like that fatherless kid who never knew what it means to get a gift from a dad. They dont have a blessing like Sikhi in their lives, they dont have a father like Kalgidhar Patshah Ji, they dont have anything such as the Khalsa appearance or the 5 kakaars which they can call as gifts. But since we do, they have a problem with these. What else can they do except try to rob us of these? Khalsa ji, do not take Sikhi for granted. Please dont! This whole world is full of ashamed and fatherless people who do not have anything to be proud of, or anything to value in their lives. We have everything! Our Guru Sahibaan, the priceless jewel of Gurbani, our Puratan Singhs/Kaurs, our itihaas, our Gurmat philosophy, these are all like those medals which the Generals son is so proud of. These are all those gifts which a loving fathers beloved son holds near and dear to his heart and soul. Those who dont have such a father, or those who dont even know about their father, they always have, they still do, and they always will have a problem with the Khalsa! Mehtab Singh Nov. 4th, 2013
  17. Recently a member brought to my attention a thread on this forum which aims to denote the factual integrity of Saraghari as a myth. The essential crux, of this denotation, is that the British and Sikhs always re-wrote their losses in order to exhibit a sense of victory and self-proclaimed glory. In short, the initiator of the myths and facts analysis believes that the battle has been considerably hyped at the expense of his poor, yet silent suffering race. I could not resist going back to the history books again, and have written a rebuttal (if you may) to our doubting friend. I have used several significant military sources, all with proven credibility, and other verified texts in constructing the below article. If, however, some members feel I might have overstepped the mark then please inform me. 'Strength down to half but good news! Each one of us has now two rifles.' -Dispatch from the battle at Saraghari, 1897 A.D. (1) Leonidas and his 300 Spartans established a new and unique military doctrine at Thermopylae. Named after the locus of their last stand, the Thermopylean conflict is a sporadic occurrence in military pragmatism. Fundamentally it pits a much superior offence against an inferior defense (although anomalies exist). Leonidas and his 300 men themselves faced a much superior force of 100-150,000 Persians during their last stand. (2) Their main aim was to detract or delay the foe until a much poignant rival force could be collated from mainland Greece. In this they succeeded, although by forfeiting their own lives. A step-by-step surgical analysis of their strategy inaugurates the following: -The defense will often be an archetypal last stand. Its constituents will be foolhardy in the defense of their aims, but not to the extent of heedlessness. -The offence will be forced to blunt it's initial thrust, or establish a new stratagem, as the defense will occupy a much better strategically placed locus. At Thermopylae Leonidas placed his men in a narrow passage. The Persians were forced to re-vamp their initial tactic and faced a Spartan picket bristling to the teeth. -The offence will be forced to utilize a tidal technique, although this is not necessary. A well ensconced, and established defense, cannot be attacked with a straight-forward march and confront technique. Often attrition will have to be adopted as a principle Modus operandi, and the defense will be assaulted by different companies in a repetitive fashion. -The foremost aim of the defense is to either buy time for reinforcements or a collation of forces on an unprecedented scale. If it succeeds in this, despite forfeiting itself, it has succeeded in it's designs and desires. -Technological, geographical, intelligence and disciplinary ingenuity all play a pivotal role in a Thermopylean conflict. If possessed by the defense, then a plausible modicum of success is ensured although to what extent is determined by it's own subsequent conduct in the engagement itself. These doctrines were well established in the mind of Lt. Col John Haughton, of the 36th Sikhs, as he marched towards fort Lockhart in the Samana ranges of the Hindu Khush. An avid veteran of Afghani warfare his mission was clear. To neutralize any plausible ally of Czarist Russia, in the North-West Frontier, via utilizing several companies of his battalion efficiently and fluidly. His forward base was to be at Fort Lockhart, neighbored by it's sibling Fort Gulistan in the present day North-Western Frontier. Initial intelligence briefings indicated that local Islamic leaders had been whipping up a pandemonium in the regional Afghani Afridi and Orakzai tribesmen. Haughton ordered his officers to be on their guard whilst simultaneously dispatching a small task-force towards Saraghari. The latter was a military outpost, constructed for helicographic contact between Lockhart and Gulistan. Despite their immediate vicinity, both forts were separated by rugged and mountainous terrain and were not immune to elemental disruption. The helicograph became a pivotal tool for keeping both in contact, a fact which did not escape Afghani watchers. On September 3rd, 1897 A.D., 5,000 Orakazai horsemen attacked Gulistan. The 130 Sikhs, occupying the fort, under Maj. C.H. Desvoeux and Lt. A.K. Blair offered exceptional resistance forcing the Orakazais to retreat. (3) Five days later a more substantial force of tribesmen returned. Two days later they were forced to retreat via Haughton himself, who arrived with 150 Sikhs from Lockhart. (4) Realizing that Saraghari might be a potential target, Haughton reinforced the communications outpost until at full strength it possessed one NCO and 20 OR's (other ranks). The ingenuity of the tribesmen was to however obfuscate him soon, and thrust him into dire straits. On 12th September, the 19 year oldhelicograph operator, Gurmukh Singh, reported a mass movement towards the outpost, to his superior Havildar Ishar Singh. Both men ascended to a higher platform and attempted to analyze the situation. The Havildar finally gauged that it was potent sign of war. Waves upon waves of Afridi and Orakzai tribesmen were marching towards Saraghari. Calmly ordering Gurmukh Singh to inform Haughton and request reinforcements, Ishar Singh prepared to be besieged. Haughton's reply has not been properly established. Two conflicting versions have been put into play. The initial states that he sent a reliving force towards Ishar Singh but it encountered marauding tribesmen, whereas another states that his resources were stretched. The former seems more likely. Under the aegis of Gul Badshah, the tribesmen were striving to conquer Gulistan. (5) The latter would have been a mass improbability if Saraghari had been reinforced by Lockhart. Thus it seems Haughton's substantiated refusal was justified not by a lack of manpower, but by a stringent blockading of his passage towards Ishar Singh. Ultimately, whatever the vindication Ishar Singh found himself solely confronting a murderous horde of blood thirsty tribesmen. Whilst Havildar Singh called a Chinese Parliament* and attempted to form a course of action, Gurmukh Singh repeatedly cast up to date minutes to Haughton. At 9.00 am he signaled the arrival of Afridis and Orakzais. Subsequently battle was joined. The 20 men under Ishar Singh refused to surrender to the foe. The ancestors of the latter had indulged in religious bigotry, and rapine on their sacrosanct land of Punjab. Their own ancestors had refused to give or take any quarter from them, and they too wanted to emulate this valorous tradition. By the time the first shot had been fired, all 21 men inside the post had determined to die defending their mission. The location of Saraghari prevented Gul Badshah from employing the tried and tested tactic of foolhardy charges. He was forced to adopt attrition as a means of achieving his goal. Organizing his men in batches of 150-180 companies (6) he dispatched them towards the communications post. The Havildar meanwhile had been witnessing these proceedings and gauged the inferiority of the tribal artillery. Armed with the newest Martini-Henry rifle, effective up to 600 yards, the 21 besieged waited until the tribal waves were in range and then fired. (7) Their murderous volley repeatedly dwindled the attackers until finally, before midday, Gul Badshah himself came to the fore. An astute negotiator, Badshah brought his entire skill set to the fore. He argued with Ishar Singh that resistance was futile and the deaths of his 20 men would achieve nothing. If all 21 emerged from the fort then he would let them leave unharmed, whilst Haughton would vindicate them due to the numerical foe they faced. Both Singh, and he, were leaders of men and thus knew the intricacies of the battlefield and leadership. The aphorism live to fight another day would serve them both well. Singh, with an emphasized candor, rebutted his offer word for word and a resigned Badshah summarily left. The battle then recommenced. Haughton meanwhile was attempting to gauge the numerical superiority of Badshah. Along with his men, veterans of earlier Afghan campaigns, he identified 14 religious ensigns. Bringing his past experience to the fore, he summarily concluded that Ishar Singh faced 10-12,000 tribal's out of which only less than 200 were able to engage the Sikhs at any given time. (8) The unequal locus of Saraghari was too narrow for an en-massed assault, and too open for a lightening skirmish. Ishar Singh, so far, had utilized the battlefield well but would he be able to hold out until a much superior relief arrived? The fate of Gulistan, and neighboring British protectorates, was no longer in his (Haughton's) hands. Only time would tell if a single NCO, and his 21 men, proved successful or not. Gurmukh Singh continually kept on relaying up-to-date briefings to Lockhart. By now more than 3-4 hours had elapsed since first contact and the 21 Sikhs had eaten no food or drunk water. They had fought off two assaults and suffered two casualties. Still, they continued to operate like clockwork fixedly targeting the offenders and either forcing them to retreat or killing them. Their own numbers were also beginning to dwindle. Bhagwan Singh was the first to be killed thus reducing the strength of the defenders to 20. Ammunition was also beginning to run out. Gurmukh Singh signaled to Haughton, asking for more ammunition, the Lt. Col attempted to disperse the masses swirling on the Lockhart-Saraghari rout with no success. He signaled back his inability. (9) By now Badshah himself was in desperate straits. Saraghari's location made his favored stratagem of a massed charge obsolete. The defenders were not willing to surrender, and his remaining numbers were becoming swiftly disgruntled as more time elapsed since the initial engagement. Despite breaching two pickets, the communication post still stood defiantly. Discipline was lacking among his men, who preferred the commands of different leaders simultaneously, and moral was low. Then, he spied a chance at victory. Sending his non-fighters to the scrub bordering the outpost, he had them set it on fire thus blinding the defenders (who, by now, it is believed had only less then eight men). He then sent two men to make a breach on the defender's wild side. Haughton, and his men, watched with increasing trepidation as the blinded defenders attempted to put out what they perceived as being an internal fire. This allowed several tribesmen to make a breach and enter the outpost. (10) With misery the Lt. Col watched as Ishar Singh took a last minute decision to continue fighting. Via Gurmukh Singh's relays, Haughton learnt of the Havildar's final decision. Ishar Singh ordered his men to fall back to the outpost's inner layer, whilst taking a bayonet and jumping into the mass of the bloodthirsty foe himself. In fierce hand-to-hand fighting he was wounded several times before finally being killed. His action, and sacrifice, allowed Gurmukh Singh enough time to relay to Haughton that the stampede which the defender's now faced itself was constrained by the outpost's size. Ultimately the inner layer itself was breached. The remaining Sikhs fought back with intense gusto until their last breath in an emulation of their Havildar. The 19 year old Gurmukh Singh, then himself jumped into the fray. According to Haughton, he signaled a request to enjoin the fray. The Lt. Col granted him his last desire with a heavy heart. (11) Saraghari had finally fallen. It is not known what subsequent course Badshah took next. His men, it seems, were mutinous and wanted to rest. His initial incentive had been to seize Gulistan but he had failed in this respect. Paramount discipline, and an efficient chain of command, was also lacking among his men. They preferred the commands of several different tribal chieftains at a time. Thus he was forced to give in and wait. By the next day however he found himself besieged. A potent relief force had been collated and attacked the resting tribesmen on the night of the 13th. Clockwork discipline again played a part, and Badshah was routed. Thus ended the Afghani attempt at conquering Gulistan. Havildar Ishar Singh, and his men, had succeeded in their mission. An Analysis. Despite more than a century elapsing since the battle of Saraghari, it is still being passionately debated in academic and military circles. The below points are often raised whenever the battle is studied: 1.) Did the Afghans gain a Phyrric victory? 2.) What was their ultimate goal? 3.) Is it possible for 21 men to face an onslaught by 10,000 men? 4.) What allowed Ishar Singh to hold out for the better part of a day? 5.) How accurate is Haughton's initial assessment of 10-12,000 attackers? 6.) How many casualties were incurred by the tribesmen on the 12th and the 14th? A.1.) Did the Afghans gain a Phyrric victory? A Phyrric victory is a victory gained at such a cost that any subsequent actions/courses are rendered obsolete by the reduction in the victor's forces. The Afghani incentive was to conquer Gulistan. They did not succeed thus a Phyrric victory is out of the question as they cannot be deemed as being the victors at Saraghari. A.2.) What was their ultimate goal? Gulistan, but what they intended to do subsequently is a mystery. Most historians promulgate that after Gulistan, Lockhart would have been the second target. Again, this might or might not be related to the factual truth. The swiftness with which Gul Badshah lead his men indicates that either he wanted to pursue a Fabian strategy, i.e. collate resources and men until they outnumbered Lockhart and thus force Haughton into submission; or launch a massed strike against it as well. A.3.) Is it possible for 21 men to face an onslaught by 10,000 men? Military history does not propose 'what happened' but 'what could, should or would have happened.' If we surgically analyze Saraghari we will see several different elements supporting the Sikhs. 1.) They were well entrenched and experienced soldiers. 2.) They could easily counter any decisive assault due to their location which would have been narrow for 200 men or more. 3.) They occupied higher terrain, thus they were well placed to witness any raid forming and counter it. 4.) They possessed a superior range in firearms. Their Henry Martini rifle reached up to 600 yards, thus giving them a longer reach. 5.) One has to remember that Haughton estimated there to be 10-12,000 attackers based on the banners and tactics of the tribesmen. How many actually attacked the outpost at a single time (the tidal wave theory) has not been established. Contemporaneous Afghani sources state 150-180, although these would probably have dwindled as the attackers reached the terrain on which Saraghari was situated. One also has to remember that the classic Charge-Trench ideologue did not exist at Saraghari. This was not Beersheba where horsemen charged trenches. Saraghari was a well fortified structure thus blunting the Afghani offensive. A.4.) What allowed Ishar Singh to hold out for the better part of a day? An able NCO, Singh was already a prior veteran of Afghanistan. Subsequently he was also well versed in military strategy and adaptive, essential traits which assist all military leaders. He utilized the high vantage of Saraghari, the instruments at his disposal and the training of his men. High Vantage- This would have considerably reduced the number of foes approaching, slowed their ascent and also given him time for a counter-offensive. Instruments at his disposal- The Martini-Henry rifle possessed an accurate range of 600 yards (548.64 m). Ishar Singh is said to have ordered 'fire'when the tribesmen passed the 300 yard (274.32 m) mark. Although the tribesmen possessed their own arsenal, this was not as advanced as the Sikh rifles. Combined with the clockwork precision of his men, the superior Martini would have played a cardinal role in Singh's strategy which was to delay the foe. Training of men- Via Gurmukh Singh's briefings, it has been theorized that Ishar Singh utilized a clockwork plan of action. This called for equal teams of soldiers firing upon the charging foe. Given his own prominence in the affair he would have divided his 20 men team (Gurmukh Singh was signalling) into either 4 lots of five or 5 lots of 4. The former would have seen three teams firing from their own respective positions in the outpost. One team would then have been replaced by another fresher team, while it reloaded and reinforced another. The fourth relieving team would have also reinforced another simultaneously, thus ensuring a rapidity in the assaulting fire. Via the 5 lots of 4 a similar pattern would have emerged although it's effectiveness is debatable. A.5.) How accurate is Haughton's initial assessment of 10-12,000 attackers? Valor aside, the British military was not as obdurate as is cast. It rapidly adapted to the foe's tactics and learnt lessons from near defeats and victories on the battlefield. The First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars (ranging from 1839-1880 A.D.) had taught it several new principles of Afghani warfare. Haughton himself, a Lt. Col, would have engaged in the Second Anglo-Afghan war and thus observed the proceedings. Afghani tribes, and even military leaders, preferred an en-mass cavalry charge against strategic locations. The psychological effect of seeing a mass body of horsemen, bearing down upon them, would have petrified many opposing forces into surrender. Afghani cavalry tactics often called for 150 men or more (12) to line up in equal lines and charge the foe. Not only did this provide momentum but also immediate relief if required. Whilst confronting such a horde the British would often dismount and then engage. The massed attacks on the 3rd of September, and afterwards, corroborate Haughton's estimates. On the aforementioned date it was estimated that at least 5,000 tribesmen, or upwards, attacked Lockhart. Whilst engaging forts, Badshah would have been well aware of the need of continuous momentum, and rejuvenated men. Cast as crude, his strategy, if looked at from a new light makes profound sense. He would have utilized the tidal theory. 10,000 men divided into 150 companies would have given him 66-67 attacking formations. Their large number would have allowed for continuous momentum, replacement of men and also simultaneous action if they would have been confronted by a joint task force from both Gulistan and Lockhart. He would have reinforced his initial 5,000 with double that number to be on the safe side. A.6.) How many casualties were incurred by the tribesmen on the 12th and the 14th? Upon capturing the field, the relieving force accounted 450 bodies. The latter were the tribesmen who had been killed on the 12th,13th and 14th. Gul Badshah would initially state that Ishar Singh and his men killed 150 of his tribesmen although he would soon change the number to 180. (13) British estimates varied. Given that the attacker often forfeits more men then the defender (14), it can safely be said that at least 30-40% of the casualties would plausibly have been inflicted by Singh and his men. The British estimated there to be at least twice as many wounded tribesmen. The latter never ventured to release the official number of their dead and wounded given their ironic defeat. Upon learning of their gallantry, the British government gloriously applauded the actions of the 21 deceased at Saraghari. Entranced by their valor Queen Victoria awarded each of the Sikhs the Indian order of Merit (the sub-continent's then highest military honor) and allotted a pension and land grant for their next of kin. Presently the battle has been reduced to military textbooks, but it's legend still abounds. These 21 men engraved an unique niche in historicity along with Leonidas and the countless others who engaged in a Thermopylean battle. In death they serve as an inspiration beacon, forever proclaiming 'duty onto death!' The deceased: Havildar Ishar Singh (regimental number 165). Naik Lal Singh (332). Lance Naik Chanda Singh (546). Sepoy Sundar Singh (1321). Sepoy Ram Singh (287). Sepoy Uttar Singh (492). Sepoy Sahib Singh (182). Sepoy Hira Singh (359). Sepoy Daya Singh (687). Sepoy Jivan Singh (760). Sepoy Bhola Singh (791). Sepoy Narayan Singh (834). Sepoy Gurmukh Singh (814). Sepoy Jivan Singh (871). Sepoy Gurmukh Singh (1733). Sepoy Ram Singh (163). Sepoy Bhagwan Singh (1257). Sepoy Bhagwan Singh (1265). Sepoy Buta Singh (1556). Sepoy Jivan Singh (1651). Sepoy Nand Singh (1221). Sources and footnotes: *Chinese Parliament- A military congregation where rank is not customary or obligatory. Any decision manifested is entirely democratic. 1.) Accessed from http://magellanclubforkids.com/2012/09/20/against-all-odds/ 2.) Cassin S.J; (1977) The Greek and Persian Wars 500-323 B.C. Osprey publishers, pg. 11. It is customary to acknowledge that whereas modern scholars give this figure, contemporaneous scholars estimated at least a million Persian soldiers to be present. 3.) Sidhu S.D, Virdi A; The Battle of Saraghari, The Last Stand of the 36th Sikh Regiment. Gyan Khand Media, India, pg. 3. 4.) ibid, pg. 3. 5.) ibid, pg. 4. 6.) Badsey S; (2008) Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, 1880-1918, Barnes and Nobles, UK, pg. 150. Additionally see 3,000 years of Warfare for a profound exegesis of Attrition. 7.) Accessed from http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/History/First150/238-Defending-Saragarhi.html 8.) Accessed from http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/military-history/12117-battle-saragarhi-21-sikhs-versus-10-000-pathans.html 9.) Accessed from http://khalsa-raaj.blogspot.co.nz/2011/09/battle-of-saraghari.html 10.) Accessed from http://swordarm.in/?page_id=21 11.) Accessed from http://magellanclubforkids.com/2012/09/20/against-all-odds/ 12.) Badsey S; (2008) Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, 1880-1918, Barnes and Nobles, UK, pg. 150. 13.) Maj. Gen. Jaswant Singh Letter to H.M. Queen Elizabeth II Institute of Sikh Studies (1999). 14.) Singh; A (2010) The Last Sunset, Roli Publishing a division of Lotus Books. See sub-section titled First-Anglo Sikh War. http://tisarpanth.blogspot.co.nz/2014/08/21.html?view=magazine The question and answer component was done with the aid of a military historian. If you possess any questions on it then please post them below, and I will forward them to him. Thank you.
  18. I was recently researching the history of Nanded (there is not much on it except in the 'Master's Presence') and decided to make a post about it. Here is the result: Hazoor Sahib and the Khalsa. 'Many people became martyrs there; and many houses for fakírs were erected in that place. Amidst them all, they erected a shrine over the Gurú[’s ashes], and, near his burying place, they made many other mausoleums and dharamsálas, and deposited Granth sáhibs in them. The name of that city, which was called Nader, was changed to Abchalnagar. In the present day, many Sikhs go there, and offer their oblations with much devotion. In that tomb, thousands of swords, shields, spears, and quoits, are to be found at all times; moreover the Sikhs, who go there, all worship those arms. The Sikhs believe this, that all those arms were formerly the property of Guru Govind Singh himself.' (1) One might enquire, where does the Khalsa reside in it's pristine form? The answer would inevitably be Hazoor Sahib, Nanded. One of the five sacrosanct religio-political medians, of the Khalsa, Hazoor Sahib possess a magnetic pull for the Khalsa. Devoid of the anglophonic reformism, which plagued it's North Indian counterparts, the shrine still boosts an extensive populace of Nihungs, Udasis and Nirmalas who otherwise have been effaced from their Punjabi strongholds. Despite it's prominence in the contemporary Khalsa's psyche, many adherents are still ignorant of it's multifarious historicity and often mistakenly categorise it as being the melting point between the Khalsa and other anachronistic traditions. The Akali-Nihungs believe it to be the prototypical locus of Akali-Nihung Guru Gobind Singh Ji. The esteemed Nihung pedagogue, Mahant Trliochan Singh Ji holds Nanded to be the original birthplace of the Guru before he manifested the Khalsa. Going by him, one understands that the Guru originally meditated on the divine Akal-Purakh, here, before migrating to the lofty peaks of Hemkunt. Subsequently he merged himself into the supreme consciousness before being dispatched to creation in the form of Guru Gobind Singh Ji. After exhausting Aurangzeb's nefarious crusade against him, the Guru was approached by the latter's son, Bahadur Shah, for assistance. Realizing that the latter was weaker than his incendiary predecessor, the Guru agreed to aid him knowing that Shah's victory would grant the Khalsa a temporary relieve. Thus he set about mediating between the Shah and his foes and/or engaging them in the spirit of an ubiquitous peace. Penultimately he journeyed with his newfound ally to Nanded, where the latter decided to subdue his rebellious sibling Kam Baksh. 'After seeking the Guru’s advice on what to do next in the face of the challenge from his brother, Kam Baksh, Bahadur Shah arranged to take his army towards Hyderabad. The route took them through Nanded on the banks of the River Godavari where they halted for several days. While the emperor moved off to continue his campaign, the Guru remained at Nanded to consider his plans.' (2) Subsequently the Guru decided to reside in Nanded, diverting from Shah who by now claimed the title of undisputed emperor of India. 'Guru Gobind Singh arrived at Nanded with all the majesty of a regional Rajput court. In his entourage were 300 heavily armed Akali-Nihang warriors and a stately retinue bustling with mendicants, poets, scholars, musicians, cooks and scribes. He camped, as he always did while travelling from place to place, about a mile outside the town.' (3) Here, he set about finalising the Sri Sarbloh Granth and preparing Akali-Nihung Binod Singh, and Banda Singh Bahadur, for a political and socially oriented conflict in the Punjab. In 1708 A.D. the Guru consecrated the Adi Guru Granth Sahib Ji as his perpetual successor and journeyed to his final abode. Subsequently a mass portion of his companions left to join Banda, in the Punjab, or seek residence in other sub-continental regions. A handful however elected to stay behind, under the aegis of Akali-Nihung Santokh Singh Ji who, 'raised an unadorned stone platform (‘chabootra’) over the mound' (4) where the Guru had been cremated. In time his fledgling band was swelled by erudite scholars (the Nirmalas), passionate advocates (the Udasis) and other Nihungs. Acknowledging the need of a Pater familias, Santokh Singh in due time commenced with electing a singular heir, to succeed him, a tradition which continues even contemporarily. The deleterious inclinations of the regional Muslim populace was soon answered via a new strategy, construed by the Nihungs. Their counterparts in the Punjab would often elect a battalion, which would then for a specified period camp in the grounds of Hazoor Sahib and safeguard both the shrine and the local Khalsa populace. (5) By 1770 A.D. a weakening Afghani influence, and military under the command of Ahmad Shah Abdali, boosted several new powers onto the sub-continent's political scene. The Sikhs were plausibly the most deviant amongst them, owing to the fact that their political system boosted several varied nation states knit in a loose confederacy. Amandeep Madra, digresses from the popular doxa that this was an advantageous system, instead citing, 'in spite of the Khalsa’s initially successful revolution to overthrow the Mughal government in Punjab, their mission faced a major setback following a split in their ranks.' (6) The Khalsa, in Nanded, had managed to escape the worst of the Islamic offensive against their Punjabi brethren but faced a dire osmosis themselves. It was during the latter period that a new champion emerged. In an era where Sikhs such as Kaura Mal (a Nanakpanthi) rose to great prominence, another unsung hero Chandu Lal himself was beginning to enjoy ascending stardom. The latter was an accountant for the Nizams of Hyderabad, whose territory incorporated Nanded, and became the elect representative of his people. Lal's political strategy was based on a model of evolution, emulation and adoption; thus ensuring his perpetual prominence in state affairs. This was to serve him well in the coming era. Penultimately Sikander Jhah ascended the Hyderabadi throne amongst much strife in 1803 A.D.. With both the British and Marathas vying for dominance in the greater part of India, he faced internal factionalism and rebellion. Realizing that Hyderabad's respite, from Maratha dominance, would swiftly end in the face of his inaction Jhah summoned Lal. Acknowledging his own parochialism, Jhah requested Lal to summon aid from Ranjit Singh. The Sikh emperor of the Punjab. Prior to 1803, two Sikh diplomats had already established an alliance of goodwill with Hyderabad and Jhah wanted to expand upon it. Thus, with his agreement, Chandu Lal deputed an emissary to the Punjab and ask Singh for assistance. The latter however proved more obfuscating than initially thought. He demanded that Jhah grant him expressive permission to build a Sikh centre in Nanded, incorporating Hazoor Sahib, and the monarchy ensure the paramount safety of all Sikh pilgrims. Jhah readily acquiesced fearing the looming rebel threat and Ranjit Singh dispatched a 12,000 strong brigade to assist his forces. Amongst the latter, the Akali-Nihungs rapidly became famed as an effective policing force. Their stern mindedness, and radical loyalty ensured a swift quelling of any mutineers. The consequence of these Nihungs can be garnered from the fact that they were paid 10 Rupees in wage, whereas their Arab and Rulhia counterparts were paid only five and six Rupees respectively. (7) Meanwhile another decisive episode was playing out in Hyderabad. The British eradication of the Marathas, in 1817 A.D., allowed them the opportunity to form coalitions with many newly independent fiefdoms. Dispatching envoys to the Nizam they were delighted to learn that Lal would readily acquiesce to their presence. But the Governor-General's agent, Metcalfe, was not so readily brought to the notion. 'Governor-General Lord Hastings pointed out his pivotal role to Metcalfe: "I feared that, in your dissatisfaction at not finding in ChundooLal so perfect an instrument as you wished, you had overlooked the deep engagement of the Government to uphold him." Metcalfe was not impressed with his government’s compromising position.' (8) Metcalfe's disdain, it seems, stemmed from several facts amongst them being Ranjit Singh's blockading of British expansion in the Punjab. Simultaneously Chandu Lal's employment of the Akali-Nihungs, in the state militia, did not curry him favour in the agent's eyes. Reports from Punjab perpetually reiterated the inflammatory nature of these men and cautioned Europeans from approaching them. Lal employed 2,000 of them in his cavalry, and a further 2,310 as infantry. (9) Metcalfe was plausibly one of the initial individuals to acknowledge Hazoor Sahib as a threat, especially if the British were to engage Ranjit Singh to the north. The Nihungs, despite being alien from Singh, nonetheless possessed a patriotic undercurrent and could effortlessly engage British forces in a costly war which could potentially alienate Hyderabad from the ubiquitous colonial spectrum. The regional British resident, Colonel James Fraser, also identified the Nihungs and the mainstream Sikh populace as a threat although his brief was diluted by his close relations with local Sikh leaders. Whilst Nanded continued to flourish as an ambivalent British bastion, events to the North-West of the sub-continent manifested new and grim realities. On 27th June, 1839 A.D., an ailing Ranjit Singh finally died ending a four decade inhibition on British expansionism. His chosen successor, Kharak Singh proved to be acutely maladroit and several different Princes and factions laid claim to the throne. Overnight, Punjab had become an unrestrained space. An element which the British could not tolerate. Conquered territories, under Sikh rule, commenced expressing malcontent but the British elected to play a waiting game. A strong-willed successor could easily restore the Sikh empire's prominence and prowess but would the latter be cordial to the British? Would he/she allow British penetration towards the North-Western frontier? Whilst these dubieties plagued the British, Fraser concluded his brief and submitted it to the Nizam the following year. Initially landing on Chandu Lal's desk, the latter processed it through the bureaucratic framework. The result? 'Fraser's Sikh report was kept pending for several years.' (10) Lal was fast becoming a British antagonist, but would this new course serve him well in the coming era? Only time would tell. (Continued in the 'Nihungs of Nanded, Hazoor Sahib and the Khalsa Part II'). Sources: (1) Accessed from: https://www.facebook.com/photo.phpfbid=466081230104924&set=a.196886630357720.48096.196229850423398&type=1&theater (2) ibid. (3) Accessed from: https://www.facebook.com/photo.phpfbid=466481280064919&set=a.196886630357720.48096.196229850423398&type=1&theater (4) ibid. (5) Accessed from: https://www.facebook.com/photo.phpfbid=466903703356010&set=a.196886630357720.48096.196229850423398&type=1&theater (6) Accessed from: https://www.facebook.com/photo.phpfbid=467316379981409&set=a.196886630357720.48096.196229850423398&type=1&theater (7) Accessed from: http://www.<banned site filter activated>/htmls/article_samparda_hazoori2.html (8) Accessed from: https://www.facebook.com/photo.phpfbid=468144949898552&set=a.196886630357720.48096.196229850423398&type=1&theater (9) Accessed from: https://www.facebook.com/photo.phpfbid=468538873192493&set=a.196886630357720.48096.196229850423398&type=1&theater (10) Accessed from: https://www.facebook.com/photo.phpfbid=469409606438753&set=a.196886630357720.48096.196229850423398&type=1&theater Original article: http://tisarpanth.blogspot.co.nz/2014/07/in-nanded-we-reside.html?view=magazine Please like Tisarpanth on facebook for more content.
  19. WJKK WJKF Dear Brothers and Sisters, I have the following car registrations for sale. Please contact me should you be interested. KH14LSA KJ14LSA
  20. Erudite scholars of the Dasam Granth, and Sri Sarbloh Granth, have concluded that Kali plays an important role in both scriptures. She is a metaphor for associating femininity with the Akal. In this article I hope to highlight the societal, and familial factors which convinced Guru Gobind Singh Ji to utilise Kali in his works. The Dasam Granth residences a plethora of mystical-cum-spiritual metaphors which are fecund spectres of an ubiquitous vision. One such spectre is that of Kali, the dark Goddess. Evolving from a primeval genesis, Kali is presently a household deity amongst the sub-continent's denizens. Possessing a bloody historicity, to rival that of the Mexica pantheon, Kali for the Khalsa is not a reverential deity but a figurative utility for it's femininity. The often bloody historicity of the Khalsa has marginalized it's feminism, in pursuit of a more hyper-masculine monomania. Despite it's Gurus' emphasis on gender equivocalism, the latter principle is found ardently lacking in practice. Even today the pseudo-inter religious governing body, the SGPC, veto's women from performing Kirtan in the cardinal Darbar Sahib. A similar strain is also visible in the collective Sikh psyche of today. Despite acknowledging the existence of a formless God in their ethos, they will still opt for a more patricentric God in an emulation of Semitism. Ironically this is a notion which directly contradicts the feminism invoked in the Dasam Granth. To understand why the Dasam Granth utilises Kali, to showcase femininity, one has to understand the historic milieu orbiting it's creation. Authored by Akali-Nihung Guru Gobind Singh Ji, it was written at a time when the societal segregation of Hinduism was at it's peak, and subsequent Islamic invasions had divided sub-continental society in believer and non-believe. The elite strata, of Hinduism, had escaped the greater Islamic penchant for persecution via allying themselves with the Mughal dynasty. Approving the latter course, the Mughal nucleus had readily allowed the latter a constrained practice of their faith. Summarily the nadir strata of Hinduism now faced two dangers. The orthodox hegemony lead by the fanatical Brahmins, or religious clerics, and the whims of Islamic radicals. Simultaneously the Brahmins restrained the performance and observance of religiosity to themselves and their male hierarchy, whilst forbidding women and the servile classes from emulating them. In the periods which followed the servile classes, and women, were slowly deprived of their deities, until penultimately Kali was left. Kali herself was perceived as being an ostracised deity by the Brahmins. Born during a mythical era of warfare, her figurative symbolism had been lost through the ages until ultimately her figure was defined in numerous modes. For the ostracised layers of Hinduism she represented a sporadic escape, an hearkening to an era where she would manifest and slaughter the malesh (filth) plaguing them. Her persona spoke volumes to the Guru who not only wanted to parent a distinct socio-religious parcel but also uplift the proletariat regardless of the latter's allegiances, associations and beliefs. Decrying her worship, he nonetheless adopted her as a clandestine metaphor for his literary works. Kali's spectral prowess over death was employed by him to depict the maternal aspect of the Akal, or the deathless entity. Simultaneously her ability to consume time was another element which he favoured and aligned with the Akal who fluidly exists over time and it's offshoots. Other factors, which were pivotal, in the Guru's adoption of Kali are found in his own life and hierarchy. Wendy Doniger argues that 'other people's myths' assist one in bettering one's own persona and traits. These 'other myths' provide an anti-inertial, and diverse, balance in one's understanding of one's own life and environment. The Khalsa Gurus' resided during a time when the folklore of Hinduism was a sub-continental phenomena, thus to assist their apostles in understanding their own unique dictums they employed well-recognised and known figures to assist them. His predecessor's anti-inertial devices were not lost on the Guru, who also forwarded the latter tradition. Secondly, despite his masculine attributes and generalship he was also close to feminism himself. His father had been executed by the fanatical Aurangzeb, and he had been left in the care of a mother who had acted as a decisive vizier for him in his early years. His own grandfather, Guru Hargobind Sahib Ji, had also deputed his wife and mother as his regents when he himself was imprisoned by the Mughals. Thus his family had seen a balance between male and female paradigms, a course not lost on him. Thirdly he employed a sublime figure. Kali is not overly beauteous, but nor was her role as an embodiment of warfare. Acknowledging this reality, the Guru added her to his own growing repertoire of literal arsenals. Fourthly Kali, for the Guru, became a stereotypical element of his own war against the contemporaneous polity. The dark, almost devilish, goddess wars against injustice in order to liberate her pantheist brethren. Simultaneously the Guru also uplifted the servile out castes of his milieu and armed them to fight the tyranny inflicted upon them. In Kali he found a kindred spirit and acknowledged this element in his writings. Fourthly the Guru gifted a parental Kali to the embryonic Khalsa. For him the purity of a female was beyond doubt, and the Khalsa too would have to imbue the same spirit in order to wage it's perpetual war against abibek. Conclusively, for the Guru, Kali became an integrative element of his revitalising of society. The fact that he could envision a female wielding a sword depicts the importance of both masculinity and femininity in human society. In the post-Guru era, Khalsa women would foster a strong tradition of warrior-dom and leadership. Mata Bhag Kaur, the Guru-mother's Mata Sahib Kaur and Sundar Kaur, Sada Kaur, Rani Jind Kaur are only few of the names which come to mind when acknowledging the matriarchal aspect of Khalsa historicity. Thus one cane easily summarise that for the Guru, Kali was a multi-faceted deity which he employed for anti-inertial and figurative upliftment. http://tisarpanth.blogspot.co.nz/2014/05/why-kali.html?view=magazine
  21. Seeing NATO'S and USA'S surrender of their Afghan campaign, although kudos to the fact that they gave Islamic radicals a taste of their own medicine, I have decided to do a short article on Hari Singh Nalwa's conquest of Afghanistan. Presently I am doing an article on Nalwa himself, and would love to do a second one on his exploits in Afghanistan. I would like to incorporate and answer the following points in my article: - What makes Hari Singh's conquest of Afghanistan so different from prior conquests lead by the Macedonians and the Marathas? - What political, social and religious factors assisted Nalwa in consolidating his prowess in Afghanistan? - What military factors contributed towards Nalwa's victory in Afghanistan? - How does NATO'S campaign differ from Nalwa's? -What elements are similar in both historic and modern campaigns? -If anything what lesson can we derive from both Hari Singh Nalwa's and NATO'S campaigns? For those who don't know, tisarpanth blogspot is my intellectual possession and most of the articles on there are my work. However I am always on the lookout for a fresh perspective on matters and decided to inquire around on forums, to see what answers I can gain on this new topic of mine. Any historic sources you know of will also be appreciated in this matter.
  22. Nice article on maharaj. http://tisarpanth.blogspot.co.nz/2014/04/the-divine-sovereign.html?view=timeslide No pen can suffice to describe his greatness only attempts can be made.
  23. Guest

    Want To Become Khalsa

    wjkk wjkf i am a mona sikh right now but i have been thinking for a while to take khande di pahul and become khalsa. i have struggling with the five thieves but i do have dard for sikh kaum. i don't how to start i can't read or write gurmukhi or punjabi but i can speak punjabi. i don't know what paath to do can someone like please explain how can i start to become a sikh and something to help with five thieves. i heard their is no point of doing paath in english because the meanings are translated differently. i hope you guys can help me I'm confused and clueless at the moment i want to hopefully one day become a khalsa and son guru gobind singh ji.
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