1984 Sikh Massacre: Who Asked The Police Not To Intervene , And Why ?

[SadSingh]

taken from

http://sikhsiyasat.net/2015/07/04/1984-sikh-massacre-who-asked-the-police-not-to-intervene-and-why-excerpts-from-sanjay-suris-book/

Sanjay Suris book: 1984 The Anti Sikh

Violence and After. The excerpts, in

verbatim, are being reproduced as follows for

the information of readers/ visitors of the

Sikh Siyasat News:

The top police leadership had moved

fast, in a way. Orders for police

preparedness had come swiftly after

news of the shooting of Indira Gandhi

police officers not posted in the local

districts headed to the armed police

centre where units of the armed police

were available, and from where these

armed men could be led by these newly

transferred officers.

To deal with what? They were never

deployed to deal with the city cracking

up all around them. So what was the

perceived threat for which they were so

hastily mobilised and kept on the ready

within a few hours of the assassination?

Deployed but for what?

The instant deployment of DCP rank

officers to the armed police could only

have been ordered by the police

commissioner. He knew the city was in

flames around him, that men were out

killing he saw that for himself on the

morning of 1 November at Rakab Ganj

gurdwara, which was attacked, a few

minutes drive from Teen Murti Bhavan.

The police commissioner had visited

Rakab Ganj briefly from Teen Murti

Bhavan, where he had positioned

himself around the VIPs filing past Mrs

Gandhis body. Early reports from the

gurdwara area had spoken of Sikhs

within the gurdwara hitting back at

advancing crowds. That brought the

police commissioner there he was quick

to go to places where reports arose of

Sikhs hitting back.

After setting up an armed police reserve

so rapidly, and moving senior officers

there to command it, the police

commissioner did not then order their

deployment around the city. Were they

kept in preparation to deal with

aggression from the Sikhs? Because

they certainly were not called upon to

stop aggression against the Sikhs.

The officers with the armed police knew

they were needed, they had asked to be

sent out. This was refused. The unit

that went out to east Delhi led to a

fearful inspector buying bullets from

soldiers to show he had done nothing

when in fact he had. Other units stayed

put.

It was known to the top police officers

that besides these hundreds of armed

policemen waiting to be deployed, some

at least among the thousands of other

armed policemen on routine duties could

be available for redeployment from their

scattered posts in an emergency. Some

of them were posted close to the

trouble in the districts. So, many more

armed policemen were available than

these waiting busloads.

To this huge force of the Delhi Armed

Police add a large force from the Central

Reserve Police Force (CRPF), at whose

raising day the top officers sat on the

morning when word came of the

assassination. This was an armed force

available for the police to summon

whenever and wherever the Delhi Armed

Police might not be enough. And they

were called up a full platoon from the

CRPF stood at the Rakab Ganj

gurdwara doing nothing to stop mobs

advancing there; they stood as

witnesses to the scene and to the fact

that an armed force was available to

the police, should the police have

wanted to stop the killers. They should

have.

What one police officer did

And what could Kanwaljit Deol do as a

DCP on a regular posting already with

the armed police? She was asked to go

home. She was then nine months

pregnant, and her boss undoubtedly

was kind to suggest this. None of the

other DCPs with the armed police and

several had been stationed there was

pregnant. As it turned out, Kanwaljit

Deol could in any case not go back to

find any rest.

Kulbir Singh said she should go back

and rest, so she left, said Shamsher

Deol. Our house was in East Kidwai

Nagar, opposite the All India Institute of

Medical Sciences (where Mrs Gandhis

body had been taken on the morning of

the assassination). From our house, you

could see the main road. She reached

home and went to the roof. She saw a

bus being stopped. She saw passing

Sikhs being taunted; they didnt even

know what had happened.

Then they started stopping buses and

pulling out people. They pulled out one

sardar, and roughed him up, his turban

fell off. He grabbed it and started

running, he jumped over the nullah.

After a bit he stopped and started

putting his turban back on. But three or

four men started running towards him

again. Mrs Deol saw this, walked out

and stood between them and the

sardar. She spoke sharply to them, told

them What are you doing? They

stopped, looked a little uncertain, they

turned around, and they went back. And

she was just one pregnant housewife.

So that was what you needed at that

particular time to stop people from

doing anything. I think if these 200300

armed cops we had with us had been at

the AIIMS, it would have had an impact

on these men. It would have taken very

little to put the squeeze on.

As a top police officer of the armed

police, Kanwaljit Deol could do nothing.

In her capacity as a pregnant woman,

she came close to saving a life. The

men she confronted didnt need even to

hear a shot from a revolver, she just

shooed them away; and away they

went.

Word of strong police action on that

evening of 31 October would have gone

out to the entire police force. They

would have known that they must stop

these violent gangs. That evening those

violent groups were allowed their way

unchecked at one place; later they had

their way just about everywhere. The

police had been informed, without being

told, that if men were running riot

against the Sikhs, they must not be

stopped.

Late that night Shamsher Deol got

deployment orders, he was ordered to

move with force. But not to deal with

the attacks and all the killing that came

that night. He was ordered to head for

the five-star Ashok Hotel in

Chanakyapuri in south Delhi. That is

where VIPs arriving to attend Indira

Gandhis funeral would be staying. His

force would be posted to protect them

and to manage VIP movement. It was

there that the officer sat uselessly over

the next couple of days.

An interview

Sanjay Suri (SS): Through all this, what

did you know of [the] events in the rest

of the city?

Shamsher Deol (SD): Incidents went on

throughout the night. There were a lot

of phone calls to the police, and a lot

were unattended.

SS: The police simply were not

answering distress calls?

SD: Many people did not get through to

the police. Later one Sikh told me that

he had realised that if we phoned up

and said we are Sikhs and we are

feeling insecure, you werent going to

get any kind of response at all. So he

said he called to say that Sikhs are

gathering around here, they are

gathering around us. He said he told

others too that they should call and say

this. Once they said that, he said, they

got such a good response. Calls saying

that Sikhs were the ones attacking got

a lot more response.

SS: How many such calls might have

been made?

SD: We really dont know how many

because everybody wasnt in the know

of what was really happening. People

(in the police) were suppressing

[information], they were not recording,

they had just put the phone off the

hook, because you can just imagine how

many phone calls were coming through.

SS: And you were sent to Ashok Hotel?

SD: Yes, that night I was asked to go

out to Ashok Hotel, where the VIPs

would be gathering for the funeral.

There they gave me force.

SS: Did the force include Sikhs?

SD: Two of the officers were Sikh,

Inspector Shamsher Singh and another

guy. When they were coming for work

on 1 November, they barely managed to

make it. They were in civvies.

SS: Were Sikh police officers attacked?

SD: Yes. We had called a force from the

Police Training School, I had a lot of

people there doing courses. Those

trucks were stopped at Uttam Nagar (in

west Delhi) when they were coming.

Look at the boldness these people

stopped police trucks, with policemen

with arms inside them. They saw three

Sikhs inside. They said, we want them

to step out of the trucks. They were not

handed over, but look at the audacity.

SS: In Ashok Hotel did you have an idea

whats going on in the city?

SD: We didnt know what was going on,

except that here and there we would

see smoke going up. We didnt know

why it was like that.

SS: Did you encounter any of these

crowds directly?

SD: The next morning I was going to

Ashok Hotel from home, and I saw four

chaps carrying iron rods, one had a

sword. I told my driver to stop. I

challenged them, and they just ran.

There was a time when the slightest

show of intent would have had the

desired result. I was in plain clothes but

I had a pistol in my hand. I had got

myself a 9 mm that I then kept with me.

SS: What was going on within the police

force?

SD: I did turn up later at the police

headquarters. You see, a lot of the time

what happens is that when you do

something wrong, you start defending

yourself, and then you start believing

that defence. And then you find all sorts

of reasons why you couldnt handle the

situation, you say there were no clear-

cut orders. But you dont need, you

didnt need, orders.

SS: Did you have any direct dealings

with the police commissioner?

SD: Subhash Tandon was the CP

(commissioner of police). He earlier had

a very good relationship with the Nehru

family. He was from the Rajasthan

cadre. That was before he became

commissioner.

SS: But were there clear orders from the

commissioner that the police should go

out and stop this?

SD: Well, he is a nice man and

personally a gentleman . . .

SS: Yes, personally a gentleman, but

were not talking about that.

SD: On 1 November he landed up at

Ashok Hotel to make sure all was OK.

There was blood on his uniform. He told

me, Shamsher, people have gone mad.